PRIMARY  VS.  REPRESENTATIVE  GOVERNMENT 


By  J.  W.  Garner 

University  of  Illinois 


Reprinted  from  the  Proceedings  of  The  American  Political  Science  Association,  1907 


\yB.  REPRESENTATIVE  GOVERNMENT 

By  J.  W.  Garner 
University  of ' Illinois 

The  newer  institutional  forms  of  democracy — the  referendum  in  its 
various  forms,  the  initiative,  proportional  representation,  the  recall, 
popular  election  of  United  States  senators,  direct  primaries  for  the 
nomination  of  candidates — all  indicate  the  growing  self-consciousness 
of  the  masses  and  the  demand  for  a more  direct  participation  in 
government  than  the  pure  representative  system  allows.  Secretary 
Root’s  recent  declaration  that  the 

whole  civilized  world  is  swinging  away  from  its  old  governmental 
moorings  and  entrusting  the  fate  of  its  civilization  to  the  capacity  of 
the  popular  mass  to  govern^ 

is  a statement  the  truth  of  which  needs  no  proof  for  its  establishment. 
Still  others  whose  opinions  are  entitled  to  consideration  are  telling 
us  that 

the  representative  system  after  a century  of  existence  under  a very 
extended  suffrage  has  failed  to  satisfy  the  expectations  of  its  early 
promoters  and  is  likely  to  make  way  in  its  turn  for  the  more  direct 
action  of  the  people  on  the  most  important  questions  of  government.^ 

Certain  it  is  that  the  character  of  representative  government  is 
undergoing  fundamental  changes  not  only  through  the  operation  of 
the  forms  of  democracy  mentioned  above,  but  also  through  the  new 
conception  of  the  relation  of  the  representative  to  his  constituency. 
The  earlier  conception  attributed  to  the  representative  full  independ- 
ence of  judgment  and  action,  the  right  to  interpret  the  common 
need  and  the  common  consciousness  free  from  duress  either  upon  his 
intellect  or  his  conscience.  Edmund  Burke  expressed  the  old  view 
when  he  declared  that  the  representative  owed  his  constituent  both 
industry  and  judgment  and  when  he  sacrified  those  to  the  opinion 

1 The  Outlook,  October  20,  1906,  p.  409. 

2 Godkin,  Unforeseen  Tendencies  of  Democracy,  p.  144.  Substantially  the  same 
opinion  is  expressed  by  an  editorial  in  the  Outlook  of  December  8,  1906,  p.  860 . 

164 


PlUlVtApY. 

• •*  **•  **  • * * 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  ASSOCIATION 


165 


of  the  constituent,  he  betrayed  rather  than  served  hini.,  "But-l'he  new 
'view  regards  the  representative  in  a very  differenf*; light/”  l5e 'i;?  hO 
longer  free  to  interpret  and  register  the  popular  will-^s  conscience 
and  better  judgment  dictate,  but  the  general  cons'ciansn’ess..  is>  intorr' 
si  preted  for  him  and  he  is  expected  to  obey  the  popuk^o  n^apdato!;?. 
In  determining  the  extent  to  which  direct  participation  ’of  the, people 
* in  government  is  practicable  or  desirable,  we  must  take  into  account 
% their  general  intelligence,  the  character  of  the  service  which  they  are 
called  upon  to  perform,  and  the  resulting  benefits  considered  from 
the  standpoint  both  of  administrative  efficiency  and  social  uplift. 
If  the  service  consists  merely  in  the  selection  of  those  public  officials 
4 whose  offices  are  political  rather  than  administrative  or  judicial  in 
^ character,  there  is  a general  concurrence  of  opinion  that  a wide  popu- 
lar participation  may  be  safely  permitted  if  the  electorate  possesses  a 
fair  degree  of  intelligence  and  virtue.  This  is  so  because  no  special 
knowledge  derived  from  study,  experience  or  discussion  is  required 
to  perform  the  service  intelligently  and  the  resulting  benefits  to  the 
electorate  both  through  education  and  stimulation  of  interest  in 
public  affairs  are  of  great  importance.  More  important  still  such 
participation  is  necessary  to  preserve  the  popular  character  of  the 
government  and  prevent  it  from  becoming  a bureaucracy. 

With  regard  to  popular  election  of  administrative  and  judicial 
officers,  however,  there  is  no  such  concurrence  of  opinion.  The 
result  of  the  democratic  movement  in  this  country  has  been  to  sweep 
into  its  grasp  judicial  and  administrative  as  well  as  political  offices, 
until  now,  with  remarkably  few  exceptions,  they  are  filled  by  popular 
choice.  In  some  States  the  number  of  elective  offices  has  been  multi- 
plied to  such  an  extent  that  elections  have  become  almost  a farce 
owing  to  the  bewildering  number  of  candidates  from  whom  the  voter 
"tnust  make  his  choice.^  A reduction  of  the  number  of  elective  officers 


® “The  views  of  a constituency”  says  Burgess,  “should  always  be  taken  into 
account  as  contributing  to  the  make  up  of  the  consciousness  of  the  State,  but  the 
will  of  a constituency  has  no  place  in  the  modern  system  of  legislative  representa- 
tion.” Political  Science  and  Constitutional  Law,  vol.  2,  p.  116. 

^ An  illustration  of  this  fact  was  afforded  by  the  election  of  November  6, 1906, 
in  Chicago.  Owing  to  the  great  number  of  offices  to  be  filled  at  the  election,  a 
ballot  nearly  2 feet  square  (26  by  19  in.)  was  required.  There  were  seven  party 
columns  containing  the  names  of  334  candidates.  The  Chicago  Record  Herald 
justly  complained  that  there  were  no  electors  in  Chicago  who  could  vote  such  a 
ballot  intelligently  and  urged  that  it  should  be  simplified  by  a reduction  in  the 
number  of  elective  offices.  Horace  E.  Deming,  Esq.,  in  a recent  address  before 


034  \ 


166 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE 


througli  {hfe  adoption  of  the  appointive  method  for  the  filling  of  purely 
a.dfliinifetVativG  positions  would  result  not  only  in  the  selection  of  a 
lietter  .cl^isS'rQf  drdinmistrative  officials,  but  through  a simplification 
of  the’ balldt,  it'-^puld  tend  to  elevate  the  character  of  the  election 
and  render  less  difficult  the  exercise  of  the  voting  privilege.® 

df  the^  service  of  the  elector  consists  in  passing  judgment  upon  the 
merits  of  untried  legislative  or  administrative  projects  (as  opposed  to 
concrete  results  already  attained),  a higher  degree  of  intelligence  is, 
of  course  required,  in  the  absence  of  which  there  must  be  a loss  of 
efficiency,  though  the  moral  and  educational  benefits  to  the  electorate 
on  account  of  being  permitted  to  share  in  the  service  may  outweigh 
the  disadvantage.  If  governmental  efficiency  were  the  only  considera' 
tion,  government  by  a benevolent  despot  or  by  a small  body  of  trained 
bureaucrats  free  from  popular  control  would  possess  obvious  advan- 
tages over  democratic  government  which,  as  Sir  Henry  Maine -has. 
observed,  is  the  most  difficult  of  all  forms.®  But  it  must  not  be  lost, 

the  National  Municipal  League  entered  a protest  against  the  useless  multiplica- 
tion of  elective  offices.  He  described  the  ballot  used  in  a recent  election  in  New 
Jersey  as  being  2 feet  and  8 inches  long  and  containing  the  names  of  164  candi- 
dates. He  showed  how  the  ballot  used  could  have  been  simplified  by  the  elimina- 
tion of  at  least  three-fourths  of  the  names,  leaving  a small  ballot  with  a dozen  or 
more  names.  Making  so  many  offices  elective,  he  declared,  “confuses  the  voter 
as  to  the  real  political  results,  gives  abundant  opportunity  for  and,  indeed,  neces- 
sitates slates  and  combinations,  cumbers  the  electoral  machinery  adds  to  the- 
expense,  and  increases  the  complexity  of  campaigns,”  and  at  this  particular- 
primary,  required  the  printing  of  74  names  to  be  passed  upon  by  every  voter.. 
The  result  was  that  the  voter  was  “hopelessly  entangled  in  the  intentional  absurdi- 
ties of  the  ballot  and  hence  unable  to  exercise  an  intelligent  and  discriminating 
choice  and  to  make  his  choice  effectual.”  Proceedings  of  the  National  Municipal 
League  for  1906,  p.  312. 

® It  is  a subject  of  growing  complaint  that  elections  are  coming  to  be  too  com- 
plex for  the  average  voter  to  exercise  his  privilege  intelligently.  The  New  York 
Nation  complaining  of  this  tendency,  recently  declared  that  for  weeks  before  the 
election  of  November,  1905,  the  newspapers  were  turned  into  primers  of  instruc- 
tion for  the  voters.  The  spectacle  of  “educated  New  Yorkers  annually  learning 
how  to  vote”  has  come  to  be  one  of  the  regular  features  of  political  life  in  the 
metropolis.  In  the  election  referred  to  above  13,000  votes  were  cast  for  Jerome’s 
republican  opponent,  although  the  latter  had  withdrawn  from  the  race.  These 
votes  would  doubtless  have  been  cast  for  Jerome  but  for  the  fact  that  the  ballot 
was  very  complicated  and  there  was  fear  that  the  attempt  to  vote  a split  ticket 
would  result  in  the  spoiling  of  the  ballot.  Accordingly  the  electors,  voted  the 
straight  ticket  in  order  to  be  sure  that  their  ballot  would  be  counted. 

® “Of  all  the  forms  of  government,  democracy  is  the  most  difficult.  Little  as 
the  governing  multitude  is  conscious  of  this  difficulty,  prone  as  the  masses  are  ta 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  ASSOCIATION 


167 


sight  of  that  governmental  efficiency  is  only  one  and  some  writers 
maintain,  the  least  important  end  of  an  administrative  system. 
Professor  Goodnow,  goes  to  the  length  of  asserting  that 

the  prime  end  of  all  governmental  systems  should  be  the  cultivation  in 
the  people  of  a vigorous  political  vitality,  a patriotic  loyalty  and  social 
solidarity,^ 

an  end  he  says  which  is  not  attained  by  a bureaucratic  system. 
Even  Bluntschli,  who  tells  us  that  among  civilized  peoples,  direct 
democracy  is  always  a sham,’’  admits  that  the  mass  of  the  people  are 
elevated  by  participation  in  public  affairs  and  are  distinguished  from 
those  who  are  not  permitted  to  share  in  the  government  by  a richer 
and  more  conscious  development  of  their  faculties.®  It  tends  to 
create  an  active,  intelligent  and  alert  citizenship  and  thereby  to  pro- 
mote a higher  type  of  national  character.®  This  was  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal merits  which  de  Toqueville  saw  in  the  democracy  of  the  United 
States  three-quarters  of  a century  ago.  The  direct  participation  of 
the  people  in  legislation,  he  affirmed,  made  them  acquainted  with  the 
laws  and  instructed  them  in  the  art  of  government.  The  psychologi- 
cal influence  of  popular  cooperation  in  government  upon  the  electorate 
must  also  be  counted  as  one  of  the  considerations  in  its  favor,  since 

aggravate  it  by  their  avidity  for  taking  more  and  more  power  into  their  direct 
management,  it  is  a fact  which  experience  has  placed  beyond  all  dispute — The 
difficulties  are  so  manifold  and  enormous  that  in  large  and  complex  modern  socie- 
ties it  could  neither  last  nor  work  if  it  were  not  aided  by  certain  forces  which  are 
exclusively  associated  with  it,  but  of  which  it  greatly  stimulates  the  energy.’' 
Popular  Government,  pp.  87,  98. 

Comparative  Administrative  Law,  vol.  2.  p.  10. 

® Allgemeines  Staatsrecht,  bk.  6,  ch.  xxi.  Compare  Burke’s  Reflections  on  the 
French  Revolution. 

® This  idea  is  emphasized  by  J.  S.  Mill  in  his  Representative  Government,  ch.  iii; 
‘There  is  no  difficulty  in  showing,”  says  Mill,  “that  the  ideally  best  form  of  govern- 
ment is  that  in  which  the  sovereignty  or  supreme  controlling  power  is  vested  in 
the  entire  aggregate  of  the  community,”  p.  21.  Direct  participation  in  public 
affairs,  he  says,  tends  to  create  an  “active”  rather  than  a passive  type  of  citizen, 
human  beings  rather  than  machines.”  Compare  Laveleye,  le  Gouvernement  dans  la 
Democratie,  p.  273;  “No  man  can  be  considered  free  in  the  political  acceptation 
of  the  word  who  is  not  allowed  to  take  some  part  in  the  government  of  his  country.” 
Speaking  of  the  effect  of  the  referendum  upon  party  spirit,  A.  V.  Dicey  says: 
“It  is  difficult  to  exaggerate  the  immense  benefit  which  in  the  long  run  accrues 
to  a people  from  the  habit  of  treating  legislation  as  a matter  to  be  determined  not 
by  the  instincts  of  political  partisanship,  but  by  the  weight  of  argument.”  The 
Contemporary  Review,  vol.  57,  p.  508. 


168 


PROCEEDINGS  OP  THE 


popularly  enacted  legislation  is  likely  to  have  a moral  force  back  of  it 
which  renders  its  enforcement  less  difficult.  Furthermore,  admission 
of  the  people  to  share  in  legislation  tends  to  pacify  the  minority,  recon- 
cile dissatisfied  elements  and  serve  as  a sort  of  specificfor  social  diseases.^® 
But  manifestly  there  is  a point  beyond  which  popular  government 
produces  an  inefficiency  which  is  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  resulting 
educational  advantages  to  the  electorate.  When  this  point  is  reached 
the  primary  system  must  yield  to  the  representative  system.  An 
electorate  of  average  intelligence  may  very  properly  be  given  a veto 
upon  legislative  projects  of  a simple  and  purely  local  character, 
especially  if  such  propositions  involve  the  imposition  of  extraordinary 
pecuniary  burdens,  but  it  is  quite  another  thing  to  permit  every 
dissatisfied  class  in  the  state  to  formulate  legislative  projects  which 
are  complex  in  character  and  general  in  scope,  compel  a referendum 
on  their  schemes  and  have  them  put  into  force  upon  an  affirmative 
vote  of  an  electorate  a large  proportion  of  whom,  from  want  of  special 
knowledge  are  incapable  of  expressing  an  intelligent  opinion  upon  the 
merits. 

Compare  on  this  point  Common’s  Proportional  Representation,  p.  334. 

‘‘To  set  to  work  every  group  and  every  interest”  says  Bradford,  “which  has  a 
scheme  to  forward  and  with  the  proverbial  ease  with  which  signatures  are  obtained 
thrust  this  scheme  upon  the  legislature,  to  rebound  upon  the  mass  of  the  people 
for  settlement,  seems  like  the  evident  work  of  a disordered  imagination.”  Les- 
sons of  Popular  Government,  vol.  2,  p.  201.  Recently,  some  50,000  votes  were 
cast  in  Chicago  against  a proposition  to  convert  the  floating  debt  of  the  city  into 
a bonded  debt  at  a lower  rate  of  interest,  thus  saving  thousands  of  dollars  annually 
to  the  city.  In  some  instances,  propositions  of  this  sort  have  been  defeated  out- 
right. An  illustration  of  the  queer  workings  of  the  referendum  was  afforded  by 
Maryland  in  1891.  Two  amendments  to  the  constitution  were  submitted  to  the 
voters;  one  allowing  the  taxation  of  mortgage  debts,  the  other  altering  a clause 
in  the  declaration  of  rights  so  as  to  permit  a more  equitable  system  of  taxation. 
Apparently,  the  first  proposition  should  have  been  rejected  and  the  second  adopted. 
But  the  result  was  the  contrary,  the  first  proposition  being  carried  and  the  second 
rejected,  the  vote  on  the  question  of  amendment  in  each  case  being  about  one- 
third  the  total  vote  cast  for  governor.  Strangely  enough,  some  counties  were 
almost  unanimous  for  one  amendment  and  others  almost  unanimous  against 
it.  In  some  counties,  four-fifths  of  the  total  vote  was  cast  on  one  or  the  other 
proposal,  while  in  others  it  was  as  low  as  one-sixteenth.  The  explanation  given 
for  the  singular  result  was  that  the  masses  not  understanding  clearly  the  purport 
of  the  proposed  amendments  voted  as  the  political  bosses  advised.  In  the  demo- 
cratic counties,  the  instructions  were  to  vote  a certain  way,  while  in  the  republi- 
can counties,  the  leaders  directed  their  followers  to  vote  the  other  way.  In  some 
counties  where  the  leaders  had  no  pronounced  opinions,  one  way  or  other  but 
few  votes  were  cast.  Bradford,  Lessons  of  Popular  Government,  p.  561. 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  ASSOCIATION 


169 


Government  by  the  masses  in  their  primary  capacity  i:ests  ,@n 
theory  that  all  men  are  specialists  in  a great  number  of  fields^^that’ tfeVj  ’ 
mass  of  ignorant  voters,  amounting  to  tens  of  thousands  in 
cities,  many  of  them  foreigners  recently  naturalized  and  having  littlb  ; . 
or  no  permanent  interest  in  the  community,  are  as  capable’,  of, '^prO-’,’’’ 
nouncing  judgment  upon  untried  legislative  projects  or  administi-^^i  v'e  > 
policies  as  are  trained  and  experienced  legislators  and  administrators’,*  ,v’ 
and  that  they  can  not  be  swayed  by  prejudices  or  misled  by  dema-  ’ ’’ 
gogues.  The  late  Mr.  Justice  Fitz  James  Stephen  expressed  a truth 
which  history  has  abundantly  confirmed  when  he  declared  that 

government  really  done  well  requires  an  immense  amount  of  special 
knowledge  and  the  steady,  restrained,  and  calm  exertion  of  a great 
variety  of  the  highest  talents  which  are  to  be  found. 

An  example  of  the  failure  of  government  by  the  people  in  their 
primary  capacity  is  found  in  the  management  of  the  business  affairs 
of  the  trades  unions  in  England  where  an  attempt  was  made  to  secure 
to  every  member  a direct  share  in  the  conduct  of  the  affairs  of  his 
association.  The  result  of  half  a century’s  experience  has  been,  so  the 
historians  of  English  trades  unionism  tell  us,  instability  in  legisla- 
tion, dangerous  unsoundness  of  finance,  and  general  weakness  of 
administration.  The  initiative  was  early  abandoned  and  the  refer- 
endum instead  of  being  extended  has  been  greatly  limited  in  practice.^* 

A recent  illustration  of  the  futihty  of  submitting  to  the  people 
measures  of  an  administrative  character  which  require  special 
knowledge  such  as  is  possessed  by  only  a comparatively  small  por- 
tion of  the  population  was  afforded  by  the  referendum  in  Ilhnois  (Nov- 
ember, 1906),  on  a proposition  to  empower  the  commissioners  of  the 
Illinois  and  Michigan  Canal  to  sell  certain  lands  belonging  to  the  canal 
which  were  described  in  a certain  joint  resolution  of  a previous  session 
of  the  legislature,  the  lands  to  be  sold  in  accordance  with  the  condi- 
tions set  forth  in  the  said  resolution.  The  voters  were  left  to  findsout 
as  best  they  could  where  the  lands  were,  why  it  was  desired  to  sell 
them  and  what  were  the  conditions  of  sale  referred  to  in  the  joint 
resolution.  Not  one  elector  in  ten  was  qualified  to  cast  an  intelligent 
vote  on  the  proposition  and  it  was  too  much  to  expect  that  they  would 
go  to  the  trouble  of  informing  themselves  of  the  merits  of  the  measure 
through  research  or  correspondence.  They  did  the  only  natural 

Liberty,  Equality  and  Fraternity,  p.  245. 

Sydney  and  Beatrice  Webb,  Industrial  Democracy,  chs.  i and  ii. 


170 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE 


^ „tHing[t.o  be  done  under  the  circumstances,  namely,  abstain  from  voting 
< ; ,6mthe  pi;6DGsition  and  accordingly,  it  was  lost  by  default,  though  a 
large  majority  of  those  who  voted  on  the  measure  voted  in  the  affirma- 
"rive.^*  , Itris  difficult  to  see  what  is  to  be  gained  either  by  way  of  pop- 
' lilar  education,  public  control,  or  administrative  efficiency  through 
„vt he,  employment  of  the  referendum  on  quasi  technical  questions  of 
this  character  when  the  judgment  of  the  voter  is  limited  to  a single 
yes  or  no  and  when  there  are  no  practical  means  of  estimating  the 
merits  of  the  measures  submitted.  A somewhat  careful  examination 
of  the  results  of  the  workings  of  the  referendum  both  in  Switzerland 
and  in  this  country,  shows  that  the  vote  cast  on  referendal  proposi- 
tions has  been  with  rare  exceptions,  distressingly  small,  thus  raising 
the  question  whether  after  all  the  masses  of  the  people  are  really 
interested  in  the  demand  for  a wider  extension  of  the  referendum  and 
whether  if  granted,  they  would  avail  themselves  generally  of  the  privi- 
lege. The  important  constitutional  amendment  of  1891  establishing 
the  initiative  in  Switzerland  was  adopted  by  a referendum  in  which 
less  than  half  of  the  registered  voters  participated,  and  it  not  infre- 
quently happens  that  on  propositions  submitted  by  the  cantonal 
legislatures,  the  vote  in  some  communes  falls  as  low  as  15  and  even 
10  per  cent  of  the  total.  In  the  canton  of  Berne,  of  sixty-eight  statutes 
which  owe  their  existence  to  direct  legislation,  only  eight  were  ap- 
proved by  a majority  of  the  voters. In  Zurich  as  many  as  30  per  cent 
of  the  ballots  cast  are  often  blank  and  most  of  the  laws  enacted  through 
the  referendum  so  far  have  been  carried  by  a minority  of  the  voters.^® 

Out  of  about  900,000  votes  cast  at  the  election,  596,000  votes  were  cast  for 
and  against  the  amendment,  leaving  304,000  voters  who  abstained  from  recording 
their  judgment  on  the  merits  of  the  proposition.  As  a result  of  long  continued 
agitation  in  Illinois,  an  advisory  vote  on  the  question  of  amending  the  constitu- 
tion so  as  to  permit  the  employment  of  the  initiative  in  legislation  “thereby  restor- 
ing to  the  people  the  power  which  they  once  had,  but  which  they  delegated  to  the 
general  assembly  by  the  constitution,”  was  taken  in  1902.  About  50  per  cent  of 
the  vote  of  the  State  was  cast  in  favor  of  the  proposition,  but  according  to  one 
observer,  many  of  those  who  voted  in  favor  of  the  proposition  did  not  know  what 
it  meant  and  among  them  were  many  business  and  professional  men ; some  thought 
they  were  voting  for  the  referendum  instead  of  the  initiative;  while  thousands  of 
laboring  men  voted  in  the  affirmative  not  because  of  any  opinion  which  they  enter- 
tained regarding  the  merits  of  the  initiative,  but  because  the  word  had  been  passed 
around  from  the  “union”  to  vote  for  the  proposition.  Brown,  The  Initiative 
in  the  American  Journal  of  Sociology,  May,  1905. 

Arthur  S.  Hardy,  The  Independent,  June  13,  1907,  p.  1408. 

E.  V.  Raynolds,  Yale  Review,  vol.  4,  p.  290. 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  ASSOCIATION 


171 


It  is  ridiculous,  says  Deploige,  a native  student  of  the  referendum 
in  Switzerland,  to  talk  of  legislation  by  the  people  when  more  than 
half  of  the  citizens  refuse  to  exercise  their  legislative  rights. 

American  experience  with  the  referendum  has  in  general  shown  the 
same  indifference  and  apathy.  Only  in  exceptional  cases  have  con- 
stitutional or  legislative  proposals  called  out  a vote  equal  to  50  per 
cent  of  the  total  and  in  most  cases  it  has  been  less.  Owing  to  the 
common  requirement  that  proposed  constitutional  amendments  shall, 
in  order  to  be  valid,  receive  a majority  of  the  votes  cast  at  the  election 
at  which  the  amendment  is  submitted,  it  has  proved  impossible  to 
bring  about  needed  constitutional  changes  in  many  of  the  States. 
To  mention  a few  examples,  by  way  of  illustration,  an  important 
amendment  to  the  constitution  of  Illinois,  the  need  of  which  scarcely 
any  one  denied,  was  defeated  in  1896  because  only  about  one-fifth 
of  those  who  voted  for  presidential  electors  cast  a vote  on  the  question 
of  amendment. In  November,  1906,  a proposed  amendment  was 
submitted  to  the  voters  of  Kansas  and  only  60,000  votes  were  cast  on 
the  proposition  though  more  than  300,000  votes  were  polled  by  the 
head  of  the  State  ticket.  Practically  all  attempts  to  amend  the 
constitution  of  Indiana  have  resulted  in  failures  on  account  of  the 
indifference  of  the  voters.  In  November,  1906,  a much  needed  amend- 
ment to  which  there  was  little  opposition,  was  submitted  to  the  voters 
of  that  State  and  it  had  the  singular  fate  of  being  voted  on  by  only 
one-twelfth  of  the  voters  who  went  to  the  polls. Where  a majority 
of  those  voting  on  the  proposition  to  amend  is  sufficient  to  adopt, 
it  sometimes  happens  that  amendments  are  carried  by  a small  minor- 
ity of  voters.  This  happened  in  Louisiana  in  November,  1906,  where 
several  important  amendments  were  adopted  by  a vote  of  one-sixth 
of  the  electorate. 

Experience  with  the  referendum  on  State  statutes  and  municipal 
questions  shows  less  indifference  on  the  part  of  the  voters,  but  with 
rare  exceptions,  the  abstentions  are  more  numerous  than  the  votes 
cast,  so  that  the  results  often  represent  the  opinions  of  the  minority 
rather  than  of  the  majority.^® 

The  total  vote  cast  at  the  election  was  1,090,869;  the  vote  on  the  question  of 
amendment  for  and  against  was  239,576. 

The  total  vote  cast  was  600,000;  on  the  question  of  amendment  51,000. 

Recently  in  Buffalo  only  9641  votes  were  cast  on  a proposition  looking  toward 
the  establishment  of  a municipal  lighting  plant.  In  Boston  in  1894,  the  popular 
vote  on  the  rapid  transit  question  was  less  than  one-third  of  the  total  vote  cast 


172 


PROCEEDINGS  OP  THE 


Of  all  municipalities  in  the  country,  Chicago  has  had  perhaps  the 
most  satisfactory  experience  with  the  referendum  and  the  results 
there  have  been  such  as  to  encourage  the  belief  that  direct  legisla- 
tion within  proper  restrictions  may  be  practicable  under  modern  urban 
conditions.  During  the  last  five  years,  the  electors  of  that  city  have 
been  called  upon  to  pass  judgment  on  not  less  than  fifteen  propositions 
of  State  or  municipal  policy  and  in  almost  every  case,  an  intelligent 
use  has  been  made  of  their  power.  Furthermore,  what  is  remarkable 
when  compared  with  the  experience  of  other  cities,  the  proportion  of 
votes  cast  on  the  various  questions  submitted  aggregated  in  most 
cases  about  two-thirds  of  the  total  vote  cast  at  the  election  and  in  a 
few  instances,  the  proportion  was  considerably  larger,  thus  showing  an 
absence  of  that  popular  indifference  which  in  so  many  other  places 
has  led  to  a practical  breakdown  of  the  referendum.  But  for  the 
most  part,  the  questions  upon  which  the  referendum  was  taken 
related  to  municipal  policies  in  which  all  classes  of  the  people  felt 
a deep  personal  interest,  and  since  the  vote  in  each  case  was  preceded 
Ilby  a campaign  of  education  by  the  advocates  and  opponents  of  the 
various  measures  submitted,  it  was  not  unnatural  that  large  votes 
should  have  been  polled.  But  where  propositions  were  submitted 
which  were  semi-technical  in  character,  which  had  a general  rather 
than  a local  interest,  and  which  were  not  elucidated  by  public  debate 
and  discussion,  such  for  example,  as  the  proposition  to  enable  the 
commissioners  of  the  Illinois  and  Michigan  Canal  to  sell  certain  lands, 
popular  interest  was  slight  and  the  propositions  were  defeated  by 
default  rather  than  by  opposition.  We  may  conclude,  therefore, 
that  a limited  use  of  the  referendum  may  be  desirable  in  the  interest 
of  popular  control  and  political  education,  but  rarely  for  administra- 
tive efficiency.  If  applied  to  simple  questions  of  public  policy  of 
a purely  local  character  in  which  the  masses  of  voters  have  a personal 
interest  such  as  they  have  in  the  choice  of  public  officers,  the  referen- 
dum may  subserve  a useful  purpose  both  by  way  of  restraint  upon  the 
government  and  by  way  of  popular  education  and  stimulation  of 
interest  in  public  affairs.  But  in  general  application  to  large  dis- 
tricts and  to  general  questions  of  legislative  policy  or  to  quasi  technical 
questions  of  an  administrative  character,  the  referendum  has  no 

and  the  question  was  finally  settled  by  less  than  one-sixth  of  the  electorate. 
Within  the  last  few  weeks,  the  question  of  introducing  the  commission  plan  of 
government  in  Wichita,  Kansas,  was  settled  by  a referendum  in  which  only  4500 
voters  out  of  a registered  electorate  of  about  13,000  persons  took  part. 


AMEKICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  ASSOCIATION 


173 


place  and  can  only  lead  to  results  which  are  worthless  if  not  mis- 
chievous. 

On  the  whole,  experience  with  the  initiative  and  referendum  shows 
that  their  use,  particularly  for  the  determination  of  questions  of 
administrative  policy,  should  be  restricted  rather  than  extended.  The 
growing  disposition  to  take  a referendum  on  every  question  of  public 
pohcy  upon  which  there  may  be  a difference  of  opinion,  strikes  at  the 
root  of  efficient  business-like  administration.  The  practice  of  taking 
a referendum  on  several  questions  at  the  same  time  at  which  an  elec- 
tion of  officers  is  held  greatly  comphcates  the  election,  confuses  issues 
of  policy  with  personal  issues  and  leads  to  results  which  do  not  repre- 
sent the  popluar  will.^®  This  is  the  testimony  of  the  election  commis- 
sioners of  Chicago  where  this  practice  has  caused  considerable  dissatis- 
faction. To  provide  separate  elections,  however,  in  order  to  simplify 
matters  and  permit  independent  judgments  on  the  measures  submitted 
would,  of  course  add  greatly  to  the  expense  of  holding  elections  in 
addition  to  the  loss  of  time  and  the  demoralization  incident  to  an 
election.  In  most  States  there  are  already  too  many  elections  (Illinois 
is  a notable  example)  and  any  proposition  which  contemplates  an 
addition  to  the  list  is  subject  to  serious  objection  whatever  may  be 
its  merits  in  other  respects.^'  It  is  not  at  all  unlikely  that  we  shall 
soon  witness  a reaction  against  the  present  clamor  for  more  direct 
government  by  the  masses.  The  idea  of  the  right  of  everybody  to 
take  part  in  pubHc  affairs  by  proposing  laws  for  the  good  of  the  coun- 
try has  an  attractive  ring  to  it,  but  in  practice,  says  Professor 
Lowell,  it  has  not  proved  of  value. The  same  judgment  must  be 
expressed  with  regard  to  the  use  of  the  referendum,  except  where  it  is 
employed  in  accordance  with  the  restrictions  and  conditions  indicated 
above.  The  representative  system,  with 'all  its  faults,  will  sooner 

At  a recent  election  in  Portland,  Oregon,  twenty-one  propositions  were  sub- 
mitted to  the  voters.  The  results  illustrate  the  dangers  of  popular  legislation.  A 
gas  franchise  for  twenty-five  years  was  approved  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  the 
best  informed  students  while  propositions  for  moderate  increases  of  compensation 
for  certain  city  officials  were  voted  down. 

The  supreme  court  of  Delaware  speaking  of  the  referendum  said : “ The  fre- 
quent and  unnecessary  recurrence  of  popular  elections,  always  demoralizing  in 
their  effects,  are  among  the  evils  that  can  befall  a republican  government;  and 
the  legislation  dependent  upon  them  must  be  as  variable  as  the  passions  of  the 
multitude.  Rice  v.  Foster,  4 Harr,  479. 

The  Referendum  and  Initiative,  International  Journal  of  Ethics,  vol.  6,  p.  55. 


174 


PROCEEDINGS 


or  later  come  to  be  better  appreciated  as  the  glaring  defects  of  direct 
legislation  become  more  manifest.  If  there  be  one  principle  clearer 
than  another,  says  Woodrow  Wilson,  it  is  this:  that  in  business, 
whether  of  government  or  of  mere  merchandise,  somebody  must  be 
trusted.  Power  and  strict  accountability  are  the  essential  constit- 
uents of  good  government Jefferson,  whom  the  friends  of  the 
initiative  and  referendum  never  cease  to  quote  in  support  of  their 
schemes,  saw  that  government  was  practicable  only  when  carried  on 
by  a comparatively  few  men.  There  is  a natural  aristocracy,  he  said, 
founded  on  talent  and  virtue  which  seems  destined  to  govern  societies ; 
and  of  all  forms  the  best  is  that  which  provides  for  the  introduction  of 
this  class  into  the  government Lecky  in  his  Democracy  and  Liberty 
has  pointed  out  the  dangers  of  government  by  those  whom  he  calls 
the 

“poorest,  the  most  ignorant,  the  most  incapable  who  are  necessarily 
the  most  numerous.’’  Such  an  idea,  he  says,  “reverses  all  the  past 
experience  of  mankind.”  “In  every  field  of  human  enterprise,”  he 
continues,  “in  all  the  competitions  of  life,  by  the  inexorable  law  of 
nature,  superiority  lies  with  the  few  and  not  with  the  many,  and  suc- 
cess can  be  obtained  by  placing  the  guiding  and  controlling  power 
mainly  in  their  hands.” 

“ Congressional  Government. 

^ Quoted  by  Signorel,  Allude  de  legislation  compares  sur  le  Referendum  Legislatif, 
p.  22.  Signorel  concludes  after  an  elaborate  study  of  the  working  of  the  referen- 
dum in  Switzerland  that  it  is  not  practicable,  that  it  has  proved  an  obstacle  in  the 
way  of  good  legislation  and  has  been  responsible  for  much  unwise  legislation.  He 
declares  that  the  people  are  unfitted  to  legislate  themselves  and  if  permitted  on  a 
large  scale,  it  will  lead  to  tyranny  and  the  ruin  of  liberty,  p.  458. 


